Executive Tenure And Firm Performance: An Empirical Examinat (2024)

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  • Aviral Kumar Tiwari

Abstract

In a typical corporate setting, a CEO is analogous to the captain of a ship with ultimate authority vested in him by the board of directors of the firm. During the period he heads the firm, it is expected that he would render his services as a fiduciary of the shareholders. By virtue of being in the role of a fiduciary, he would be expected to take wise decisions which benefits the firm in long/short term and the stakeholders of the firm become well off. Chairman is another top executive who oversees the actions of the CEO. In some cases, both the office of a CEO and chairman is headed by the same individual known as dual executive. The objective of this study is to explore the relationship between firm performance and tenure of top executives in the Indian context. Executive tenure is calculated by the number of years s/he spends in office in that capacity of a Chairman or a CEO. However, the length of the tenure varies to a great degree from firm to firm. There can be many factors impacting the duration of tenure of executives in India. So, this paper attempts to find out the impacts of performance on executive tenures of the firm. Other than that how much of an effect does various executive specific variables (such as executive age), firm specific variables (such as age of the firm, group affiliation/stand-alone firm) do have on the tenure of executives would also be explored. Top executives would be divided into three categories i.e. CEO/Managing Director, Chairman and Dual (holding both CEO and chairman position) to get better insight into the research question.

Suggested Citation

  • Aviral Kumar Tiwari & Naseem Ahamed, 2018."Executive Tenure And Firm Performance: An Empirical Examination Of The Indian Corporate Landscape,"Advances in Decision Sciences, Asia University, Taiwan, vol. 22(1), pages 321-350, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aag:wpaper:v:22:y:2018:i:1:p:321-350

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive tenure; Firm performance; Emerging economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General

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    Executive Tenure And Firm Performance: An Empirical Examinat (2024)

    FAQs

    What is the effect of CEO tenure on the relation between firm performance and turnover? ›

    Thus, a level of performance that is acceptable early in a CEO's tenure may become unacceptable later in his/her tenure. If the variance of expected performance decreases with tenure, the effect of firm performance on the likelihood of forced turnover will increase with CEO tenure.

    What is the meaning of CEO tenure? ›

    Chief executive officer (CEO) tenure—the time a person spends in the CEO position—is a key observable characteristic of the CEO that has attracted considerable attention in the fields of management and accounting/finance.

    Is there a relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance? ›

    The results of this thesis indicate that there is a positive significant effect of CEO compensation on firm performance. This effect was found for both option awards and equity incentive plans, indicating that these compensation components improve the performance of a firm.

    What is the relationship between tenure and job performance? ›

    ... Employees with longer tenure exhibit lower entrepreneurial intentions because of the ties they have to their current organization (Werner et al., 2014). Additionally, tenure can affect self-efficacy and job performance (Ng & Feldman, 2010; Sherf & Morrison, 2020).

    Who is the longest tenured CEO? ›

    ANSWER: D) Warren Buffet, who has been CEO of Berkshire Hathaway for 51 years. He is followed by Alan B. Miller, of Universal Health Services, with 42 years, and Stephen Schwarzman, of Blackstone, who has been at the helm of the investment manager for 36 years.

    What's the average tenure of a CEO? ›

    Based on the sample, the average tenure for the C-suite executives, in general, is 4.6 years, up from 4.3 years in 2022. However, the average tenure for CFOs is 4.5 years, down from 4.6 years in 2022 and down from 4.9 years in 2018, according to the firm. CEOs in the Fortune 500 have an average tenure of seven years.

    What is the average age of a CEO? ›

    We can list some other CEO's who are in the same age range or older and past the traditional retirement age. Several other slightly younger CEOs are leading major corporations and looked upon to bring innovation and fresh ideas to their businesses. The average age of the Fortune 500 CEO is 57.7 years old.

    What is the relationship between tenure and turnover? ›

    Employee turnover is an important statistic for staffing firms—it assists you in determining how often you will need to hire new employees. A high turnover rate means that your employees average a shorter tenure with your firm; when the turnover rate decreases, average employee tenure goes up.

    What is the effect of lengthening job tenure on managers organizational commitment and turnover? ›

    Results showed that lengthening job tenure decreased managers' affective commitment and increased the likelihood of turnover during a three year follow-up period for managers who had previously experienced greater success in the organization and for those whose jobs included higher levels of responsibility.

    How does CEO age affect firm risk? ›

    Highlights. I examine the association between CEO age and CEO risk-taking behavior. Older CEOs manage firms with lower stock return volatility. Older CEOs invest less in R&D, diversify their firms, and lower operating leverage.

    What is the relationship between turnover and performance? ›

    At high turnover rates, new employees usually replace employees with short tenure, and this results in minimal performance. High turnover can lead to additional costs for human resource management and recruitment (eg, in time and effort to hire new staff and train them for their jobs).

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