Commentary
Michael E. O’Hanlon Michael E. O’Hanlon Director of Research - Foreign Policy, Director - Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Co-Director - Africa Security Initiative, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy @MichaelEOHanlon
Michael E. O’Hanlon Director of Research - Foreign Policy, Director - Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Co-Director - Africa Security Initiative, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy @MichaelEOHanlon
June 1, 2022
![But CAN the United States defend Taiwan? | Brookings (2) But CAN the United States defend Taiwan? | Brookings (2)](https://i0.wp.com/www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/TaiwanArmy_001.jpg?w=1500)
- 5 min read
President Joe Biden has yet again stated that if China attacked Taiwan to reunify what Beijing sees as a renegade province with the mainland, the United States would come to Taiwan’s military defense. White House staff has again followed up these off-the-cuff presidential comments with a “clarification” that in fact, strategic ambiguity remains American policy.Somewhat oxymoronically, the United States seeks to be crystal clear about being intentionally unclear about what we would do (evocative of British policy just before World War I on whether London would come to Paris’s aid, should France be attacked).The goal is to avoid emboldening Taiwan to provoke China even as we try to deter China in the event it does feel provoked.Quite the balancing act.
But here’s the real rub: Saying we WOULD defend Taiwan militarily does not mean we COULD do so successfully. These doctrinal debates over strategic ambiguity versus strategic clarity seem strangely disconnected from military reality.
America’s policy of strategic ambiguity was born during the Cold War, when it was a simple fact that the United States enjoyed overwhelming military dominance against China in the waters and airways of the western Pacific.Even though Taiwan was 100 miles from China and thousands of miles from the United States, U.S. dominance in advanced air and naval weaponry meant that we almost surely could have come to Taiwan’s defense and prevailed. Given China’s dramatic military modernizations of recent times, the situation is now much more complex.Recent analysis that I have done at Brookings indicates that especially for certain types of blockade scenarios by which China might seek to squeeze Taiwan into submission, the United States and its allies might still win a war in which they sought to break the blockade. But we also might lose it.
In general terms, a possible naval blockade of Taiwan offers advantages to China.For this scenario, unlike that of an attempted invasion, trends in technology favor rather than hurt China, since it would be the actor threatening large military objects like ships and airfields and ports.To minimize China’s own vulnerabilities, People’s Liberation Army Navy attack submarines might be the principal assets employed, rather than surface ships or aircraft.Cyberattacks would likely support the physical operation. Beijing might escalate to the use of land-based missiles and aircraft later in a battle, depending on initial results. And all of these operations, and the effectiveness of their counters, would surely fluctuate over time. The opposing sides would seek the best places to operate (given sonar conditions and other considerations) and would vary the intensity of their efforts as a function of their effectiveness, and of the interplay between military operations and broader political dynamics in Beijing, Taipei, Washington, Tokyo, and beyond.
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My modeling strongly suggests that the outcome of such a conflict over Taiwan isinherentlyunknowable.That is true, I believe, even if the battle is assumed to remain within reasonably specific boundaries of possible escalation.
I cannot prove my conclusion beyond any reasonable doubt with simple models that depend on unclassified and potentially dated input data to generate their results. But it is doubtful that planners on either side with access to more complex models and more current data can do much better. There are simply too many major technical uncertainties — about the performance of command and control systems, undersea warfare, and possibly missile defenses, in addition to questions about resilience and reparability of the in-theater ports and runways upon which U.S. operations would depend — to permit reliable prognostication.The possibility of escalation to wider or even nuclear war of course reinforces these specific uncertainties about a more concrete scenario centered on a blockade.
The best that modeling can do to handle these variables is to create reasonable boundaries within which actual scenarios might generate their actual results.So long as those boundaries are difficult to dismiss, and include cases in which both sides win, anyone entering a war confident of knowing the winner in advance has a high analytical threshold to establish. Thus, although it is possible that planners on one side or the other (or both) could develop plausible theories, and concepts, of victory — perhaps akin in some ways to Germany’s war plans against France and Britain of 1914 and 1940 — defeat must be considered an equally plausible outcome.This conclusion should be sobering for any leader who might consider risking such a conflict in the years to come.
The implications of a responsible approach to modeling and analyzing warfighting scenarios are important not only because they should affect leaders’ assessments of the risk of war, but also for purposes of U.S. and partner force planning.Model results might for example suggest certain modifications to or modernizations of key assets to reduce vulnerabilities, especially in command and control, but also in supply and maintenance, in ordnance sustainability, and in the adequacy of anti-submarine warfare assets including planes, ships, and submarines within the U.S. military force structure. But even more, the implications should affect how all parties think about crisis management and any use of force.China should not see such limited-force scenarios as somehow safe or controllable; the United States should not necessarily respond to a Chinese blockade with a prompt counterblockade operation, if it can devise alternative approaches.
The United States should respond to any Chinese attack, yes — in that sense, there should not be strategic ambiguity — but rather than promise to respond militarily, we should seek to develop a wider range of response options that include the use of economic, diplomatic, and other tools. This approach has the benefit of being consistent with the Defense Department’s concept of “integrated deterrence,” and of not promising that we would effectively defend Taiwan when in fact it may be beyond our power to do so.
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Authors
Michael E. O’Hanlon Director of Research - Foreign Policy, Director - Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Co-Director - Africa Security Initiative, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy @MichaelEOHanlon
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Based on the article you provided, Michael E. O'Hanlon is a distinguished expert in foreign policy and defense strategy. He's a Senior Fellow at the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, with a robust background shaping American defense policy. His analysis on Taiwan's defense against potential Chinese aggression is rooted in a deep understanding of historical context, contemporary geopolitics, and military capabilities.
O'Hanlon discusses the nuances of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China, highlighting the strategic ambiguity employed by the United States regarding its military defense of Taiwan. This approach aims to deter China from aggressive action while avoiding provocation of Taiwan. He notes the historical backdrop of U.S. military dominance during the Cold War and how China's significant military modernization has altered the strategic landscape.
The article delves into potential scenarios, particularly emphasizing the complexities of a naval blockade by China against Taiwan. O'Hanlon's analysis highlights China's potential advantages in certain blockade situations due to technological advancements, focusing on naval assets like attack submarines and the role of cyberattacks.
Moreover, he emphasizes the inherent uncertainties in modeling and predicting the outcomes of a conflict over Taiwan, citing major technical uncertainties related to command and control systems, undersea warfare, and missile defenses. O'Hanlon stresses the importance of understanding the limitations of current models in accurately forecasting the outcomes of such a conflict.
He also suggests the implications of this analysis for military force planning, advocating for modifications and modernizations of key assets to reduce vulnerabilities. Importantly, he advocates for a broader approach to crisis management beyond immediate military responses, including economic and diplomatic tools, in line with the concept of "integrated deterrence."
The key takeaway from O'Hanlon's analysis is the need for a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach to deterrence and crisis management concerning Taiwan and China, rather than relying solely on military promises that may not be feasible to fulfill.
The related books authored by O'Hanlon, such as "The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint" and "The Senkaku Paradox," further demonstrate his depth of expertise in defense strategy and international relations, providing valuable insights into complex geopolitical issues. His work is significant in shaping discussions around U.S. foreign policy, especially concerning China and Taiwan.
If you'd like to discuss specific aspects or delve deeper into any of the concepts within this article, I'm here to help!